

## On the Question of Pornography and Sexual Violence

### *Moving Beyond Cause and Effect*

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What is to be done about pornography? Whenever feminists raise this question—and they have raised it insistently, on both sides of the Atlantic—one particular issue can be counted on to dominate discussion. That issue is: does pornography actually have significant effects in terms of causing violent and misogynistic behaviour? Can we, in other words, establish a firm relationship between the sphere of representation where pornography is located, and the sphere of action in which specific individuals harm other individuals? Any feminist who objects to pornography is immediately challenged to demonstrate such a causal relationship; anyone who doubts that the relationship exists is under pressure to concede that pornography is not a problem. The entire agenda for debate is drawn up in terms of this question.

The purpose of this chapter is to show what is wrong with framing the pornography issue in this way, and to suggest how feminists can move beyond simplistic notions of cause and effect without conceding the argument altogether. Arguments that pornography ‘causes’ violent acts are, indeed, inadequate. But the conclusion that therefore we should not be concerned about pornography at all is equally unjustified. Representation and action may not be related in a chain of cause and effect, but one can nevertheless discover important and complex connections between them—connections which imply that feminists should indeed concern themselves with the forms of representation that exist in our culture.

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The specific case with which we will be concerned here is sexual murder, an extreme form of violence whose catastrophic effects are impossible to deny or minimize; we believe, however, that our analysis can just as well be applied to less extreme instances. By examining the role that representations (primarily, but not exclusively, pornographic representations) play in the lives of sexual killers and in the cultures to which they belong, we hope to indicate new directions for the argument, producing a critique of pornography that does not depend on proving a specifically *causal* link with violence.

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#### PORNOGRAPHY AND MURDER: CAUSE AND EFFECT?

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More than any other form of sexual violence, sadistic sexual murder—killing in order to obtain sexual gratification—produces widespread unease about the health of the culture in which it occurs. Ever since the Jack the Ripper murders in 1888, one predictable response to this type of crime has been to ask what is wrong with the modern world that it has such people in it? And in addressing that question it has long been customary to cite the pervasiveness of pornography as a sign—perhaps even a cause—of social and sexual malaise.

This particular line of argument used to be associated with conservatives who saw sex-crime as indicative of a 'decline in moral values'. In recent years, though, it has also been deployed by a progressive and radical movement, namely feminism. It needs to be emphasized, of course, that the feminist and the conservative differ in their diagnoses of our moral ills as well as in the treatment they prescribe. Whereas conservatives criticize almost all expressions of sexuality as immoral and recommend a return to traditional religious and family values, feminist analysis criticizes instead the oppressive and misogynistic forms such expressions typically take in male-dominated culture. Stressing the pervasiveness of misogyny through time—that is, denying that we are witnessing a moral decline—feminists identify religion and the family as part of the problem.

From these otherwise opposed perspectives, however, there is some common support for the idea that pornography 'causes' sexual violence. This is the argument we want to take issue with here. For although we agree with the feminist contention that pornography is (1) oppressive and misogynistic and (2) connected with sexual violence, we do not believe that the idea of representations causing or

leading to acts such as sexual murder is either theoretically compelling or politically progressive.

We want to rehearse the arguments for this position at greater length than we were able to do in our extended analysis of the phenomenon of sexual killing, *The Lust to Kill*.<sup>1</sup> It is worth elaborating on the position we sketch there if only because it is relatively unusual, differing in crucial respects from the two most familiar feminist positions on pornography and sexual violence: to put it very briefly, we disagree *both* with those anti-porn feminists who see a connection between pornography and violence, but analyse it only in causal terms, *and* with those feminists who have been critical of causal arguments, but who basically do not believe that there is any significant connection to be made between representation and action.

### Causal Models and the Case of Ted Bundy

The issue of pornography and its alleged role in sexual murder has recently come to the attention of the public once again following the confession of US serial killer Ted Bundy immediately prior to his execution early in 1989. In his final account of himself, Bundy placed great emphasis on the role of pornography in his career as a sexual murderer. He represented himself as an obsessive consumer of increasingly sadistic material, and implied that pornography had been formative of desires which he was ultimately driven to act out in real life. He began with 'milder' forms of deviant behaviour, such as 'peeping Tom' activities, and worked his way up to repeated acts of killing.

Ted Bundy's story postulates some kind of cause and effect relation between what he read and what he did. It draws on certain familiar ideas: that images of torture, rape and murder engender (at least in some people) a compulsion to go out and do likewise; and that there is a progression—its course somehow inexorable—from less to more harmful fantasies and, by association, behaviours.

We may label these ideas about how porn affects its users the COPYCAT MODEL—you see it, then (therefore?) you do it—and the ADDICTION MODEL—initially erotic stimulation is obtained from relatively 'mild' forms of representation, but as the habit becomes established, it requires a stronger stimulus to achieve the same effect, and eventually representation itself is no longer strong enough, so that the user is impelled to act out the stimulus.

If these models are familiar, it is feminism which has made them so. For example, the copycat model is implicit in part of one of the

best-known pieces of feminist writing/action against pornography: the Minneapolis ordinance devised by Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon.<sup>2</sup> Among other things, the ordinance provides for victims of sexual violence to sue producers of pornography on the grounds that their product directly inspired an assault.

Let us hasten to point out the uselessness of denying that some incidents of sexual violence do indeed re-enact specific scenarios from pornographic texts with a literalness that might justify the epithet 'copycat'. At the hearings which took place in Minneapolis while the ordinance was being debated, witnesses testified to such incidents.<sup>3</sup> The question we raise is not whether copycat incidents occur, but whether they should be treated as paradigmatic of the general relationship between pornography and sexual violence, or whether they should be analysed as a special case. If they are paradigmatic then they provide very strong evidence for a causal model (and the adherents of causal models evidently do interpret them in this way). But we shall argue later that if we treat copycat incidents as paradigmatic we leave most incidents unexplained; that even in the case of clear copycat incidents the causal model is over-deterministic; and that copycat incidents can be explained satisfactorily without treating them as paradigmatic.

The addiction model is perhaps less familiar, though it is often an implicit accompaniment to the copycat model. Lately, though, it seems to have been gaining ground in its own right; we are hearing more and more about it, especially from women and men who wish to stress the damage pornography does to *men*.<sup>4</sup> We label it the addiction model (and note that the word *addiction* is used explicitly by the writers we are talking about) because it trades on an analogy between the use of pornography and the use of drugs (alcohol, tobacco, narcotics, etc.): all these habits are seen as harmful both to those who indulge in them—the 'addicts'—and to the community which must cope with the anti-social behaviour they engender. Although addiction is viewed as a social problem, there is a new emphasis on the individual within this model; the addict himself can be viewed as a victim whose weakness or inadequacy is exploited by the unscrupulous. We should not be surprised, then, that men find this model appealing when applied to their use of pornography; but we might do well to be suspicious of its depoliticizing implications (since the collective power of men and the institutionalized nature of sexual violence against women are nowhere at issue in this account).

The politics of the addiction account will be examined in more

detail below; meanwhile, though, let us go back to the case of Ted Bundy, who characterized himself as both copycat and junkie.

A serial sexual murderer like Bundy stretches the addiction model to its limits; here we have a habit that got totally out of control. Just as smoking a joint is sometimes depicted as the first step on a slippery slope that leads to the shooting gallery, so in Bundy's case the addiction model posits that looking at pornographic representations was the first step on the long road which led to repeated and brutal killing. Once 'hooked', he could not stop; he was compelled to increase the 'dose' to the point where his behaviour became almost unimaginably destructive.

How compelling is this account? In a society currently obsessed with the 'drug problem' it is a way of understanding deviant behaviour that carries a powerful resonance; it commands instant understanding and, given that it is a medical model, the respect accorded to scientific truths. This might be one reason why feminists find it convenient: we have very often been obliged to describe the oppression of women in terms of other, more familiar social evils in order to be understood and, beyond that, taken seriously. But what has to be remembered is that when we explain one thing in terms of another we are constructing an essentially metaphorical account. The notion of addiction to pornography is a metaphor; the mechanisms of physiological dependence that characterize, say, cocaine addiction are not directly paralleled in someone who feels a compulsion to look at porn. Feminists are usually very cautious in using 'biological' analogies which imply that aspects of sexuality are 'natural', rather than constructed or indeed chosen: it is therefore necessary to consider very carefully how apt this particular metaphor is.

Nor should we be swayed in this by the fact that Ted Bundy himself thought the metaphor apt. We make this point because it is tempting to believe that Bundy's own endorsement constitutes the strongest possible evidence for the model and for causal explanations in general. From his disinterested position as a complete misogynist, Bundy has confirmed what feminists have been saying for years, i.e. that using pornography can lead to the commission of sexual crimes. Before we turn to the theoretical shortcomings of this argument generally, it is worth pointing out why we should be wary of treating what sex murderers say about themselves as unproblematically true, even when it seems to coincide with our own analysis.

Just after Bundy's execution, a feminist friend expressed the opinion that his confession, with its support for the idea of pornography as a

cause of sex crime, would not be taken seriously by our generally misogynistic culture. She contrasted this apathy with the attention paid to less 'feminist' accounts produced by murderers: 'If he'd blamed it all on his mother,' she remarked, 'everyone would have believed him.' This is a revealing comment (and doubtless, an accurate prediction). But what it reveals is not that either the misogynistic, mother-blaming account of sex murder or the 'feminist', porn-blaming account is the truth of the matter; rather, it reveals that the discourse of explanation on this subject is highly contested and profoundly ideological.

Where does a sex killer's account of himself come from? Not, we suggest, from some privileged personal insight, but from a finite repertoire of cultural clichés which the murderer, like everyone else, has come across in case histories, pop-psychology, newspapers, films and ordinary gossip with family, friends and workmates. At any given time the clichés available are a heterogeneous and contradictory collection; some may carry more authority than others (for instance, we no longer think much of a killer who tells us he was possessed by the devil, though traces of this ancient supernatural account can be seen in the tabloid label 'fiend' used for sex murderers); new clichés may enter the repertoire, challenging or providing alternatives to the existing explanations. Porn-blaming is a recent example.

Let us examine how cultural clichés work by examining one that feminists are in no danger of confusing with 'the truth': the mother-blaming explanation of sexual murder. The idea that sexual killers are revenging themselves on dominating or inadequate mothers is a relatively recent cliché. Although it was found in expert discourse (i.e. forensic psychiatry, criminology) much earlier—its source, in fact, is psychoanalytic theory—it entered popular awareness only in the 1950s and 1960s, by way of cultural products like the Hitchcock movie *Psycho*. At this point, not untypically, the popularized version 'fed back' into expert pronouncements in a circular, reinforcing process. Police in the Boston Strangler case in the 1960s announced that they were looking for someone like Norman Bates, the mother-fixated character in *Psycho*.<sup>5</sup> The actual strangler, Albert DeSalvo, in fact bore little resemblance to this stereotype. But the perception of sexual murder as a consequence of pathological mother-son relations persisted, and during the 1970s became a theme in the testimony of some real-life killers (a striking example is Edmund Kemper, the 'Co-ed Killer' of Santa Cruz)<sup>6</sup>—whereupon it re-entered expert discourse in case-history form. The circle was completed once again.

By the time of Ted Bundy's confession in 1989, a new account had become culturally available: the porn-blaming explanation. This one entered popular awareness in a relatively unusual way, through organized political activity on the part of feminists during the 1970s. It did not replace earlier accounts like the mother-blaming explanation (or any number of other clichés, from the oversexed 'Beast' to the 'split personality' to the 'psychopath'), but it achieved sufficient status in the culture that Ted Bundy could invoke it where Ed Kemper (for example) could not.

That sexual offenders other than murderers use cultural clichés to construct their accounts of themselves is attested by the sociologists Diana Scully and Joseph Marolla who interviewed convicted rapists and found recurring, culturally familiar themes in their narratives.<sup>7</sup> Scully and Marolla call these clichés 'vocabularies of motive' and suggest that rapists use them in order to justify their behaviour and 'negotiate a non-deviant identity' for themselves.

In the case of murderers, of course, the goal is more likely to be negotiating a *deviant* identity. It is hardly surprising to find Kenneth Bianchi, one of the 'Hillside Stranglers', claiming a multiple personality—or Ted Bundy himself asserting, as he did for a number of years, that his murders had been committed by an 'entity' inside him—when one considers that, in a murder trial, convincing the court that you are incompetent or insane may be literally a matter of life and death. But for the purposes of the argument here it does not matter whether murderers have cynical and self-interested motives in offering their stereotypical accounts, or whether they sincerely believe those accounts to be true. The crucial point is that the accounts *come from the culture*. If they did not, they would make no sense, either to the murderer or to those he seeks to convince.

When Ted Bundy tells us he was corrupted by pornography, we need to ask not whether he is lying but where he got the story. It is unsatisfactory to accept Bundy's account while rejecting Kemper's just because one is misogynist while the other appears to be feminist. Instead, we must treat both accounts *as accounts*, that is, as discourse, subjecting them to further analysis and scrutiny. This is what we intend to do with the pornography-blaming explanation of sexual murder.

Before we turn to this central part of our argument, though, we want to return to a point we mentioned earlier regarding the politics of the explanation. In the discussion of cultural clichés we observed that murderers' accounts have a place within the judicial process in

which their fates are decided, and this is something which feminists cannot afford to overlook.

### The Politics of Addiction

Most court cases involving sexual murder do not revolve round the question of 'whodunnit'; there is usually, by this stage, agreement that the accused man did indeed commit the acts of which he stands accused. What is at issue is usually whether or not he should be held fully responsible for those acts. The accused and his counsel construct an account of the crimes in the hope of establishing a defence of what in English law is called 'diminished responsibility'. If such a defence succeeds, the offence is reduced from murder to manslaughter and the offender becomes a candidate for treatment rather than retributive punishment. (In most states of the USA, a crucial issue is whether the death penalty can be invoked.)

Feminists would presumably be reluctant to punish the mentally ill, and would therefore not object to this sort of defence *per se*. But in far too many cases, as a number of feminist scholars have demonstrated, diminished responsibility defences and their equivalents in other legal systems succeed although the grounds are flimsy and the underlying rationale systematically sexist. For instance, in several recent cases of wife-killing, the alleged infidelity or promiscuity or 'nagging' of the victim has been grounds for reducing the offence to manslaughter.<sup>8</sup> Sexually violent men have been defended on grounds of provocation, especially when their victims were prostitutes but even when they were children.<sup>9</sup> It thus appears that attributions of responsibility, however thickly cloaked in expert discourse, are fundamentally ideological and sexist in their operation. Their overall effect is to condone violence against women by repeatedly failing to punish its perpetrators.

If feminists follow through with the logic of the addiction model, they risk adding to an already depressing catalogue of defences and excuses. The truly novel thing about porn-blaming explanations may turn out to be that a feminist, as opposed to misogynist, account is being co-opted for use in the interests of violent men and against those of women.

The addiction model has political implications over and above its possible judicial uses, however. The central metaphor of drug addiction carries strong connotations of abnormality and deviance of the individual addict: drug abusers are seen as personally or socially inadequate—in some more liberal accounts, as disadvantaged and in



need of help. Feminists have spent around twenty years attempting to combat the notion that sexual violence is the province of the pathological individual, arguing instead that it is structural and systemic, arising from gender hierarchy and conflict (which it also helps to maintain by intimidating women collectively). The addiction metaphor undermines that analysis, taking us back to abnormal individuals, and evacuating sexual politics from the account. Why it should be men and not women who (1) become 'addicts' and/or (2) turn to violence as a consequence of addiction remains totally mysterious in this individualized model. Surely we can agree to locate murderers at an extreme of male violence without completely losing sight of the wider social and political context: men as a group derive benefits from the institutionalized control of women, in which violence plays a major role.

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#### BEYOND CAUSE AND EFFECT

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It will not have gone unnoticed that so far we have put forward no sustained argument against causal explanations linking pornography to sexual violence; rather we have been trying to cast doubt on some of the arguments advanced in support of such explanations. But if a sex killer's endorsement of a particular explanation does not make it true, it does not necessarily make it false either. Nor is an argument automatically false just because its political implications are unpalatable. Surely the fact that Ted Bundy read pornography and attached significance to it calls for comment from a feminist?

We fully accept each of these points, and will respond to them by doing two things. First, we will put forward a general argument against causal accounts of human action. Second, we will try to construct an alternative model of the connections between pornography and sexual violence.

#### What Is Wrong with Causal Explanations?

The central objection we have to causal explanations of the relationship between pornography and sexual violence can be stated very simply: causal accounts are completely inappropriate to explain any kind of human behaviour. Indeed, that very common term, human behaviour, has a certain misleading quality. Animals 'behave', impelled

by instinct or simple stimuli; inanimate objects can (metaphorically) be said to 'behave', impelled by physical forces. Human beings, however, *act*.

The notion of cause is most appropriate in the physical sciences. For example, if we understand the forces acting upon them—things like gravity and inertia—and we know their physical specifications (mass, weight, etc.)—we can accurately predict the motion of two billiard balls colliding on a flat surface. The balls' 'behaviour' is determined by the laws of physics.

Humans are not like billiard balls—or indeed like animals, whose behaviour can be described in terms of a stimulus–response model. Humans have the capacity for symbolization and language, which enables us—and perhaps even obliges us—to impose meaning on the stimuli we encounter, and to respond in ways which also carry meaning. Human 'behaviour', therefore, is not determined by laws analogous to those of physics. It is not deterministically 'caused'. It needs to be explained in a different way, by interpretation of what it means and elucidation of the beliefs or understandings that make it possible and intelligible.

At this point, a sceptic might well raise two questions. First of all, is not sexual behaviour an exception to this rule? Sex is surely part of our 'natural', animal endowment, an instinctive rather than a cultural phenomenon, and therefore susceptible to less complex explanations. To this we would reply, using a formulation feminists are familiar with, that there is a conceptual distinction to be made between sex, which is a biological phenomenon, and sexuality, which is a social or cultural construct. Sexuality reflects human consciousness and the ability to impose meaning on basic bodily experience. It has to do not with instinctual need but with desire; and that the forms of desire are cultural rather than natural can be appreciated if one considers the extraordinary variety of sexual practice attested by historians, anthropologists and so on (not to speak of the blatant artificiality of many human sexual conventions: do animals wear black stockings?). In human culture sex is always overlaid with sexuality; more generally, biological phenomena (the emotions, pain, the cycle of birth, maturation and death) are always overlaid with cultural discourse.

Secondly, our sceptic might object that the actions of sex murderers are also exceptional, since they are too bizarre for us to be able to say what understandings make them 'possible and intelligible'. For most people, indeed, the acts of a sex murderer are impossible and

unintelligible. But a moment's reflection will show this to be false. Of course not all of us share Ted Bundy's desires; but we are perfectly able to interpret them. We have a category for people like Bundy ('serial sexual killer') and a number of accounts are available to us to make sense of his actions (namely the cultural clichés discussed above). However repellent Bundy's acts, however distant his desires from our own, they are intelligible to us. They do not strike us as pointless and uninterpretable in the way the actions of, say, a severely autistic individual might seem pointless and uninterpretable. The difference between Ted Bundy and the autistic person is the difference between having a language (i.e. a set of socially shared meanings) and not having one. The autistic person's actions defy interpretation because only they have access to the code.

The code of sexual murder was once as uninterpretable as autistic behaviour—in some cultures, it still would be. As recently as 1888, the year of Jack the Ripper, people were at a loss to understand the motivation of someone who murdered and disembowelled prostitutes. It was seriously suggested that the killer wanted to sell his victims' reproductive organs to anatomists for profit; or that he was trying, in a grotesque way, to draw attention to the scandal of slum housing in London.<sup>10</sup> Nowadays we would immediately respond to a comparable set of killings by invoking the category of sexual murder. This account was given by some commentators in 1888, but it had to compete with other explanations (whereas today it would be the obvious, preferred account). And what this shows is that a certain interpretation or discourse has entered the culture and become familiar in the space of a hundred years.

The question we need to ask, then, is where that discourse came from, why it arose at the specific time and in the particular place it did, how it spread and developed subsequently and so on. These would be important questions because, from the kind of perspective advocated here, it is precisely the emergence of a discourse making sexual murder 'possible and intelligible' which creates the conditions for sexual murder to exist on the scale it now does: no longer as an isolated, random aberration but as a culturally meaningful act which an individual might consciously choose to perform.

We may sum up the argument so far by asserting that sexual murder is not a piece of abnormal sexual behaviour determined by innate drives, but a cultural category with a social significance. Sex killers are not responding unthinkingly or involuntarily to a stimulus, they are adopting a role which exists in the culture, as recognizable and intelli-

gible to us (albeit not as acceptable) as the role of 'artist' or 'feminist' or 'hippie'.

What of pornography? Feminist proponents of the copycat and addiction models may be espousing a causal account, but it is not guilty of the biological determinism that pervades many so-called 'scientific' explanations (e.g. the account of sexual deviance which postulates excessive levels of testosterone in offenders). Rather, the 'cause' here is social conditioning through exposure to sadistic representations. And is this not a somewhat different, less objectionable version of the causal model?

The answer, in our view, is ultimately no. This 'social' account too is inadequate because it leaves out the crucial area of interpretation of meaning. The whole idea of conditioning—addiction is simply an extreme form of conditioning—implies a gradual process over which the subject has no control, and in which he does not actively engage (it is done to him, it determines his subsequent behaviour). Here it seems to us there is an implicit behaviouristic (stimulus-response) model in operation. It is taken for granted, for instance, that the addict's compulsion is fuelled by need and not desire, his initial arousal when looking at pornography is rooted somehow in natural/biological responses. At the point where need erupts into action, the behaviourism becomes explicit.

But if once again we compare the use of pornography with the use of narcotics—a comparison to which the addiction model directs us—this account seems less than compelling. A person does not have to interpret a line of cocaine in order to feel certain effects when it enters the bloodstream. S/he does have to interpret the picture of a dead and mutilated female body, along fairly narrow and conventional lines, in order to find it erotic. When someone looks or reads, they are constantly engaging, interacting with the text to produce meaning from it. The meaning is not magically, inherently 'there' in the pictures or the words: the reader has to make it. The text does not independently have effects on readers or compel them to act in particular ways, as if they were passive and unreflecting objects. They are subjects, creators of meaning; the pornographic scenario must always be mediated by their imagination. (This, incidentally, is why pornography calls forth such a variety of responses; why not only individuals, but groups derive such different meanings from it.)

Violent sexual acts, for example murders, are also works of the imagination before they are public events. Both<sup>3</sup> common sense and the testimony of convicted rapists and killers suggest that these acts are

conceived, planned, acted out in the imagination, in a way that is active, creative and conscious.<sup>11</sup> To speak of such acts as being 'caused' in the way a virus causes disease, gravity causes objects to fall or a bell caused Pavlov's famous dogs to salivate is to misunderstand their essence, their motivation, the very thing that makes them exciting and desired: in short, it is to overlook their *meaning*.

What, then, is the meaning of sexual murder for the cultures which recognize it and the men who engage in it? Let us answer this question by giving a brief account of the emergence of sex killing (drawn from Cameron and Frazer, 1987). This involves talking mainly about the forms of discourse which made sex murder 'possible and intelligible' (and continue to do so); our focus on discourse, representation, will lead into a more specific discussion of this chapter's main topic, pornography.

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## CONCLUSION

In analysing sexual violence and its links to cultural forms such as pornography, we overlook at our peril the pre-eminent role of imaginative mediation and the creation of meaning. All humans are endowed with the capacity and perhaps the need to interpret and represent their actions, their lives; our possession of consciousness, language and culture ensure that we will impose meaning on even the most fundamental bodily experience. That is not, in itself, problematic. But it does mean we need to move beyond causal accounts of human actions, and look instead at the resources humans bring to their interpretations and representations, the meanings which shape their desires and constrain the stories they can imagine for themselves. For we are clearly not free to imagine just anything; we work both with and against the grain of the cultural meanings we inherit.

In the sphere of sexuality, pornography is a significant source of ideas and narratives. It transmits to those who use it—primarily men but also women—notions of transcendence and mastery as intrinsic to sexual pleasure. These ideas are not taken up only by those who become rapists and killers. On the contrary, they pervade our everyday, unremarkable sexual encounters as surely as they do the grotesque acts of Ted Bundy and his ilk.

In the case of sex murderers (as in many other cases), the extreme,

what is perceived as abnormal and deviant, throws light on the normal (of which it turns out to be a version). If we as feminists want to do something about sexual violence, it is precisely the normal and normative sexual practice of our culture that we must change. That means, among other things, that we must be critical of pornography and the other discourses which inform sexual practice, using our imagination to shape alternatives to the pleasures of transcendence and the thrills of transgression. In fact, feminists have been doing this for more than twenty years. But the recent focus of so many writers on causal models of sexual violence (which often imply that the problem is non-normal individuals and extreme sexual practices) is, at least in our view, a retreat from that radical politics of sexuality.

## Notes

1. See Deborah Cameron and Elizabeth Frazer, *The Lust to Kill: A Feminist Investigation of Sexual Murder* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).
2. For an account, see Catharine MacKinnon, *Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1987), ch. 14.
3. Cf. *Pornography and Violence: Evidence of the Links* (Minneapolis Hearings) (London: Everywoman, 1988); MacKinnon, op. cit., pp. 184–6.
4. The discourse of 'addiction' can be found in a number of very different sources, ranging from right-wing polemics (as in the Bundy case) through clinical materials used by those who counsel sex offenders to feminist critiques of socially-constructed dependence on various types of stimulus (drugs, alcohol, cigarettes, TV) induced by people's increasing alienation within patriarchal and capitalist cultures (see e.g. Sweet, in Catherine Itzin (ed.), *Pornography: Women, Violence, and Civil Liberties* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), ch. 10).
5. Gerold Frank, *The Boston Strangler* (London: Pan, 1967); also discussion in J. Caputi, *The Age of Sex Crime* (London: Women's Press, 1988).
6. For discussion of Edmund Kemper, see Cameron and Frazer, op. cit.
7. Diana Scully and Joseph Marolla, cited in L. Kelly, *Surviving Sexual Violence* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), p. 47.
8. Cameron and Frazer, op. cit., p. 14 note.
9. S. Edwards, quoted in Kelly, op. cit., p. 224 note 61.
10. Cameron and Frazer, op. cit., p. 125.
11. A pertinent example here is the case of Ronald Frank Cooper, discussed in Cameron and Frazer, op. cit., pp. xiii–xiv.