PHIL858E-0101: Seminar in Logic and Philosophy of Sciences; Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory-Spring 2014 epacuit
PHIL858E-0101: Seminar in Logic and Philosophy of Sciences; Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory-Spring 2014 epacuit
Course Modules
Crash Course in Decision Theory, Game Theory and Modeling Knowledge and Belief (1/27)
Crash Course in Decision Theory, Game Theory and Modeling Knowledge and Belief (1/27)
Module Completed
Module In Progress
Module Locked
-
External UrlK.R. Apt, A Primer on Strategic Games, in Lectures in Game Theory for Computer Scientists K.R. Apt, A Primer on Strategic Games, in Lectures in Game Theory for Computer ScientistsScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
-
External UrlA. Brandenburger, Origins of Epistemic Game Theory, in 5 Questions on Epistemic Logic, V. Hendricks and O. Roy (eds.) A. Brandenburger, Origins of Epistemic Game Theory, in 5 Questions on Epistemic Logic, V. Hendricks and O. Roy (eds.)Score at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
-
External UrlEP, Modeling Knowledge and Belief, Philosophy Compass, 2013 EP, Modeling Knowledge and Belief, Philosophy Compass, 2013Score at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Game Theory or Decision Theory? (2/3)
Game Theory or Decision Theory? (2/3)
Module Completed
Module In Progress
Module Locked
-
External UrlA derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game by Gilboa and Schmeidler A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game by Gilboa and SchmeidlerScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
-
Context Module Sub HeaderAdditional ReadingsScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Common Knowledge/Belief of Rationality (2/10)
Common Knowledge/Belief of Rationality (2/10)
Module Completed
Module In Progress
Module Locked
-
External UrlJ. Barwise, Three views of common knowledge J. Barwise, Three views of common knowledgeScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
-
External UrlWhat Eye Movements Can Tell about Theory of Mind in a Strategic Game What Eye Movements Can Tell about Theory of Mind in a Strategic GameScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
-
Context Module Sub HeaderAdditional ReadingsScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
-
External UrlApproximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs by D. Monderer and D. Samet Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs by D. Monderer and D. SametScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
-
External UrlThe Logic of Team Reasoning by R. Sugden The Logic of Team Reasoning by R. SugdenScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Nash and Correlated Equilibrium (2/17)
Nash and Correlated Equilibrium (2/17)
Module Completed
Module In Progress
Module Locked
-
External UrlCorrelated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality by R. Aumann Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality by R. AumannScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
-
External UrlEpistemic Conditions for the Nash Equilibrium by R. Aumann and A. Brandenburger Epistemic Conditions for the Nash Equilibrium by R. Aumann and A. BrandenburgerScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
-
External UrlIntrinsic Correlation in Games by A. Brandenburger and A. Friedenberg Intrinsic Correlation in Games by A. Brandenburger and A. FriedenbergScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Deliberation in Game and Decision Theory (2/24)
Deliberation in Game and Decision Theory (2/24)
Module Completed
Module In Progress
Module Locked
No Class (3/3): Away at Conference
No Class (3/3): Away at Conference
Module Completed
Module In Progress
Module Locked
Ratifiability in Game Theory (3/10)
Ratifiability in Game Theory (3/10)
Module Completed
Module In Progress
Module Locked
Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/24)
Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/24)
Module Completed
Module In Progress
Module Locked
Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/31)
Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/31)
Module Completed
Module In Progress
Module Locked
Iterated Dominance, Rationalizability, Common Belief in Rationality (4/7)
Iterated Dominance, Rationalizability, Common Belief in Rationality (4/7)
Module Completed
Module In Progress
Module Locked
-
External UrlThe Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games, K. Apt and J. Zvesper The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games, K. Apt and J. ZvesperScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
-
External UrlK. Apt, The Many Faces of Rationalizability K. Apt, The Many Faces of RationalizabilityScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
-
External UrlJ. Halpern and R. Pass, Conservative Belief and Rationality J. Halpern and R. Pass, Conservative Belief and RationalityScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
-
External UrlBernheim, Rationalizable Strategic Behavior Bernheim, Rationalizable Strategic BehaviorScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Iterated Weak Dominance (4/14)
Iterated Weak Dominance (4/14)
Module Completed
Module In Progress
Module Locked
-
External UrlDominated Strategies and Common Knowledge, L. Samuelson Dominated Strategies and Common Knowledge, L. SamuelsonScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Backwards Induction (4/21)
Backwards Induction (4/21)
Module Completed
Module In Progress
Module Locked
-
External UrlJ. Halpern, Substantive Rationality and Backwards Induction J. Halpern, Substantive Rationality and Backwards InductionScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
-
External UrlD. Samet, Common Belief of Rationality in Games of Perfect Information D. Samet, Common Belief of Rationality in Games of Perfect InformationScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Variants of Game-Theoretic Reasoning (4/28)
Variants of Game-Theoretic Reasoning (4/28)
Module Completed
Module In Progress
Module Locked
-
External UrlJ. Halpern and R. Pass, Iterated Regret Minimization: A New Solution Concept J. Halpern and R. Pass, Iterated Regret Minimization: A New Solution ConceptScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
-
External UrlA. Bjorndahl, J. Halpern and R. Pass, Language-Based Games A. Bjorndahl, J. Halpern and R. Pass, Language-Based GamesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
-
External UrlExplaining Strategic Coordination: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory, Strong Stackelberg Reasoning, and Team Reasoning, Andrew M. Colman, Briony D. Pulford, and Catherine L. Lawrence Explaining Strategic Coordination: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory, Strong Stackelberg Reasoning, and Team Reasoning, Andrew M. Colman, Briony D. Pulford, and Catherine L. LawrenceScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? (5/5)
What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? (5/5)
Module Completed
Module In Progress
Module Locked
-
External UrlWhat is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? by R. Aumann What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? by R. AumannScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
-
External UrlCounter-Counterfactuals by I. GIlboa Counter-Counterfactuals by I. GIlboaScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Mathematical Models in The Social Sciences (5/12)
Mathematical Models in The Social Sciences (5/12)
Module Completed
Module In Progress
Module Locked
-
External UrlCooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction by A. Colman Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction by A. ColmanScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
This course content is offered under a Public Domain license. Content in this course can be considered under this license unless otherwise noted.