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AttachmentSyllabus SyllabusScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Crash Course in Decision Theory, Game Theory and Modeling Knowledge and Belief (1/27)
Crash Course in Decision Theory, Game Theory and Modeling Knowledge and Belief (1/27)
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AttachmentLecture 1 Slides Lecture 1 SlidesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentSkyrms: Chapter 1 - Principles of Rational Decision Making Skyrms: Chapter 1 - Principles of Rational Decision MakingScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlK.R. Apt, A Primer on Strategic Games, in Lectures in Game Theory for Computer Scientists K.R. Apt, A Primer on Strategic Games, in Lectures in Game Theory for Computer ScientistsScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlA. Brandenburger, Origins of Epistemic Game Theory, in 5 Questions on Epistemic Logic, V. Hendricks and O. Roy (eds.) A. Brandenburger, Origins of Epistemic Game Theory, in 5 Questions on Epistemic Logic, V. Hendricks and O. Roy (eds.)Score at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlEP, Modeling Knowledge and Belief, Philosophy Compass, 2013 EP, Modeling Knowledge and Belief, Philosophy Compass, 2013Score at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Game Theory or Decision Theory? (2/3)
Game Theory or Decision Theory? (2/3)
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AttachmentLecture 2 Slides Lecture 2 SlidesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlA derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game by Gilboa and Schmeidler A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game by Gilboa and SchmeidlerScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentSubjective Probability and the Theory of Games Subjective Probability and the Theory of GamesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentReply by Harsanyi Reply by HarsanyiScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentRejoinder by Kadane and Larkey Rejoinder by Kadane and LarkeyScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentReply by Harsanyi Reply by HarsanyiScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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Context Module Sub Header
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Score at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete -
AttachmentIs Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality? by M. Mariotti Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality? by M. MariottiScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentRational Choice in the Context of Ideal Games by E. McClennen Rational Choice in the Context of Ideal Games by E. McClennenScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Common Knowledge/Belief of Rationality (2/10)
Common Knowledge/Belief of Rationality (2/10)
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AttachmentLecture 3 Slides Lecture 3 SlidesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlJ. Barwise, Three views of common knowledge J. Barwise, Three views of common knowledgeScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentCommon Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis' Game Theory by Cubitt and Sugden Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis' Game Theory by Cubitt and SugdenScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlWhat Eye Movements Can Tell about Theory of Mind in a Strategic Game What Eye Movements Can Tell about Theory of Mind in a Strategic GameScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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Context Module Sub Header
Additional Readings
Score at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete -
External UrlApproximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs by D. Monderer and D. Samet Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs by D. Monderer and D. SametScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlThe Logic of Team Reasoning by R. Sugden The Logic of Team Reasoning by R. SugdenScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Nash and Correlated Equilibrium (2/17)
Nash and Correlated Equilibrium (2/17)
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AttachmentLecture 4 Slides Lecture 4 SlidesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlCorrelated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality by R. Aumann Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality by R. AumannScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlEpistemic Conditions for the Nash Equilibrium by R. Aumann and A. Brandenburger Epistemic Conditions for the Nash Equilibrium by R. Aumann and A. BrandenburgerScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlIntrinsic Correlation in Games by A. Brandenburger and A. Friedenberg Intrinsic Correlation in Games by A. Brandenburger and A. FriedenbergScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Deliberation in Game and Decision Theory (2/24)
Deliberation in Game and Decision Theory (2/24)
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AttachmentLecture 5 Slides Lecture 5 SlidesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentRationality, Prediction and Autonomous Choice by I. Levi Rationality, Prediction and Autonomous Choice by I. LeviScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentDoes practical deliberation crowd out self-prediction? by W. Rabinowicz Does practical deliberation crowd out self-prediction? by W. RabinowiczScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentDeliberation does crowd out prediction. by I. Levi Deliberation does crowd out prediction. by I. LeviScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentLevi on causal decision theory and the possibility of predicting one's own actions by J. Joyce Levi on causal decision theory and the possibility of predicting one's own actions by J. JoyceScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentWhere Luce and Krantz really do generalize Savage's decision model. by W. Spohn Where Luce and Krantz really do generalize Savage's decision model. by W. SpohnScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
No Class (3/3): Away at Conference
No Class (3/3): Away at Conference
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Ratifiability in Game Theory (3/10)
Ratifiability in Game Theory (3/10)
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AttachmentLecture 6 Slides Lecture 6 SlidesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentO. Board, The Equivalence of Causal and Bayes Rationality in Games O. Board, The Equivalence of Causal and Bayes Rationality in GamesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentA reconstruction of Jeffrey's Notion of Ratifiability in Terms of Counterfactuals Beliefs by H.-S. Shin A reconstruction of Jeffrey's Notion of Ratifiability in Terms of Counterfactuals Beliefs by H.-S. ShinScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentRatifiability, game theory, and the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives by Eells and Harper Ratifiability, game theory, and the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives by Eells and HarperScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentMixed Strategies and Ratifiability in Causal Decision Theory by W. Harper Mixed Strategies and Ratifiability in Causal Decision Theory by W. HarperScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/24)
Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/24)
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AttachmentLecture 7 Slides Lecture 7 SlidesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentSkyrms Chapter 2: Dynamics Deliberation: Equilibria Skyrms Chapter 2: Dynamics Deliberation: EquilibriaScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentF. Arntzenius, No Regrest, or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision Theory F. Arntzenius, No Regrest, or: Edith Piaf Revamps Decision TheoryScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentJ. Joyce, Regret and Instability in Causal Decision Theory J. Joyce, Regret and Instability in Causal Decision TheoryScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/31)
Skyrms' Model of Deliberation in Games (3/31)
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AttachmentLecture 8 Slides Lecture 8 SlidesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentJ. Alexander, Local Interactions and the Dynamics of Rational Deliberation J. Alexander, Local Interactions and the Dynamics of Rational DeliberationScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentSkyrms Chapter 3: Dynamics Deliberation: Stability Skyrms Chapter 3: Dynamics Deliberation: StabilityScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Iterated Dominance, Rationalizability, Common Belief in Rationality (4/7)
Iterated Dominance, Rationalizability, Common Belief in Rationality (4/7)
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AttachmentLecture 9 Slides Lecture 9 SlidesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlThe Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games, K. Apt and J. Zvesper The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games, K. Apt and J. ZvesperScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlK. Apt, The Many Faces of Rationalizability K. Apt, The Many Faces of RationalizabilityScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlJ. Halpern and R. Pass, Conservative Belief and Rationality J. Halpern and R. Pass, Conservative Belief and RationalityScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlBernheim, Rationalizable Strategic Behavior Bernheim, Rationalizable Strategic BehaviorScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Iterated Weak Dominance (4/14)
Iterated Weak Dominance (4/14)
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AttachmentLecture 10 Slides Lecture 10 SlidesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentR. Stalnaker, Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games R. Stalnaker, Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in GamesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlDominated Strategies and Common Knowledge, L. Samuelson Dominated Strategies and Common Knowledge, L. SamuelsonScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentReasoning Based Expected Utility Procedure Reasoning Based Expected Utility ProcedureScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Backwards Induction (4/21)
Backwards Induction (4/21)
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AttachmentLecture 11 Slides Lecture 11 SlidesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlJ. Halpern, Substantive Rationality and Backwards Induction J. Halpern, Substantive Rationality and Backwards InductionScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentR. Stalnaker, Belief Revision in Games: Backward and Forward Induction R. Stalnaker, Belief Revision in Games: Backward and Forward InductionScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlD. Samet, Common Belief of Rationality in Games of Perfect Information D. Samet, Common Belief of Rationality in Games of Perfect InformationScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Variants of Game-Theoretic Reasoning (4/28)
Variants of Game-Theoretic Reasoning (4/28)
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AttachmentLecture 12 Slides Lecture 12 SlidesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentA. Perea, Backward Induction vs. Forward Induction Reasoning A. Perea, Backward Induction vs. Forward Induction ReasoningScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlJ. Halpern and R. Pass, Iterated Regret Minimization: A New Solution Concept J. Halpern and R. Pass, Iterated Regret Minimization: A New Solution ConceptScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlA. Bjorndahl, J. Halpern and R. Pass, Language-Based Games A. Bjorndahl, J. Halpern and R. Pass, Language-Based GamesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlExplaining Strategic Coordination: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory, Strong Stackelberg Reasoning, and Team Reasoning, Andrew M. Colman, Briony D. Pulford, and Catherine L. Lawrence Explaining Strategic Coordination: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory, Strong Stackelberg Reasoning, and Team Reasoning, Andrew M. Colman, Briony D. Pulford, and Catherine L. LawrenceScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? (5/5)
What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? (5/5)
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AttachmentLecture 13 Slides Lecture 13 SlidesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentThe Confusion of Is and Ought in Game Theoretic Contexts by Kadane and Larkey The Confusion of Is and Ought in Game Theoretic Contexts by Kadane and LarkeyScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentComments on the Interpretation of Game Theory by A. Rubinstein Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory by A. RubinsteinScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlWhat is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? by R. Aumann What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? by R. AumannScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlCounter-Counterfactuals by I. GIlboa Counter-Counterfactuals by I. GIlboaScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Mathematical Models in The Social Sciences (5/12)
Mathematical Models in The Social Sciences (5/12)
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AttachmentLecture 14 Slides Lecture 14 SlidesScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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External UrlCooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction by A. Colman Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction by A. ColmanScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentModels as Analogies by Gilboa et al. Models as Analogies by Gilboa et al.Score at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentMentalism vs. Behaviorism: A Philosophy of Science Perspective Mentalism vs. Behaviorism: A Philosophy of Science PerspectiveScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
Final Problem Set (only for those not writing a paper)
Final Problem Set (only for those not writing a paper)
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AttachmentProblem Set Problem SetScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
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AttachmentAdditional Reading on Aumann Models Additional Reading on Aumann ModelsScore at least Must score at least to complete this module item Scored at least Module item has been completed by scoring at least Score at least % Must score at least % to complete this module item Scored at least % Module item has been completed by scoring at least % View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
