PHIL808K-0101: Seminar in the Problems of Philosophy-Fall 2022 epacuit

PHIL808K-0101: Seminar in the Problems of Philosophy-Fall 2022 epacuit

Course Modules

Arrow's Theorem, Voting Methods, and Voting Paradoxes

Arrow's Theorem, Voting Methods, and Voting Paradoxes
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Arrow's Theorem, Voting Methods, and Voting Paradoxes 1636492    
  • Slides Attachment
    Slides Slides
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  • Handout Attachment
    Handout Handout
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  • Week 1 - Questions/Comments Assignment
    Week 1 - Questions/Comments Week 1 - Questions/Comments
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • M. Morreau, Arrow's Theorem External Url
    M. Morreau, Arrow's Theorem M. Morreau, Arrow's Theorem
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  • Context Module Sub Header
    Voting Methods and Paradoxes
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  • EP, Voting Methods External Url
    EP, Voting Methods EP, Voting Methods
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Preferential Voting Tools External Url
    Preferential Voting Tools Preferential Voting Tools
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Context Module Sub Header
    Proofs of Arrow's Theorem
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  • Blau, A direct proof of Arrow's theorem Attachment
    Blau, A direct proof of Arrow's theorem Blau, A direct proof of Arrow's theorem
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  • Fey, A simple proof of Arrow's Theorem Attachment
    Fey, A simple proof of Arrow's Theorem Fey, A simple proof of Arrow's Theorem
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Geanokplos, Three brief proofs of Arrow's theorem Attachment
    Geanokplos, Three brief proofs of Arrow's theorem Geanokplos, Three brief proofs of Arrow's theorem
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  • Sen, Arrow and the Impossibility Theorem Attachment
    Sen, Arrow and the Impossibility Theorem Sen, Arrow and the Impossibility Theorem
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Yu, A one-shot proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem Attachment
    Yu, A one-shot proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem Yu, A one-shot proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Context Module Sub Header
    Further Reading
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  • Patty and Penn, Measuring Fairness, Inequality, and Big Data: Social Choice since Arrow Attachment
    Patty and Penn, Measuring Fairness, Inequality, and Big Data: Social Choice since Arrow Patty and Penn, Measuring Fairness, Inequality, and Big Data: Social Choice since Arrow
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete

Majority Rule

Majority Rule
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Majority Rule 1636493    
  • Handout Attachment
    Handout Handout
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  • Week 2 - Questions/Comments Assignment
    Week 2 - Questions/Comments Week 2 - Questions/Comments
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Risse, Arguing for Majority Rule Attachment
    Risse, Arguing for Majority Rule Risse, Arguing for Majority Rule
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  • Context Module Sub Header
    Characterizing Majority Rule
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  • Dasgupta and Maskin, On the robustness of the majority rule Attachment
    Dasgupta and Maskin, On the robustness of the majority rule Dasgupta and Maskin, On the robustness of the majority rule
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Maskin, Majority rule, social welfare functions and game forms Attachment
    Maskin, Majority rule, social welfare functions and game forms Maskin, Majority rule, social welfare functions and game forms
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Woeginger, A new characterization of majority rule Attachment
    Woeginger, A new characterization of majority rule Woeginger, A new characterization of majority rule
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • May, A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision of Attachment
    May, A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision of May, A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision of
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete

Evaluating the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Condition

Evaluating the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Condition
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Evaluating the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Condition 1637396    
  • Slides - IIA Attachment
    Slides - IIA Slides - IIA
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  • Week 3 - Questions/Comments Assignment
    Week 3 - Questions/Comments Week 3 - Questions/Comments
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Ingham, Why Arrow’s theorem matters for political theory even if preference cycles never occur Attachment
    Ingham, Why Arrow’s theorem matters for political theory even if preference cycles never occur Ingham, Why Arrow’s theorem matters for political theory even if preference cycles never occur
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Fleurbaey, Social Choice and Just Institutions Attachment
    Fleurbaey, Social Choice and Just Institutions Fleurbaey, Social Choice and Just Institutions
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Bordes and Tideman, Independence of Irrelevant Alternative in Voting Attachment
    Bordes and Tideman, Independence of Irrelevant Alternative in Voting Bordes and Tideman, Independence of Irrelevant Alternative in Voting
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • W. Holliday and EP, Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections, Appendix B External Url
    W. Holliday and EP, Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections, Appendix B W. Holliday and EP, Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections, Appendix B
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete

Resolving Cycles

Resolving Cycles
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Resolving Cycles 1637413    
  • Slides Attachment
    Slides Slides
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Week 4 - Questions/Comments Assignment
    Week 4 - Questions/Comments Week 4 - Questions/Comments
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • W. Holliday and EP, Stable Voting External Url
    W. Holliday and EP, Stable Voting W. Holliday and EP, Stable Voting
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • W. Holliday and EP, Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers External Url
    W. Holliday and EP, Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers W. Holliday and EP, Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • W. Holliday and EP, Axioms for defeat in democratic elections External Url
    W. Holliday and EP, Axioms for defeat in democratic elections W. Holliday and EP, Axioms for defeat in democratic elections
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • W. Holliday and M. Kelley, Escaping Arrow's Theorem: The Advantage-Standard Model External Url
    W. Holliday and M. Kelley, Escaping Arrow's Theorem: The Advantage-Standard Model W. Holliday and M. Kelley, Escaping Arrow's Theorem: The Advantage-Standard Model
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete

Probabilistic Social Choice

Probabilistic Social Choice
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Probabilistic Social Choice 1637431    
  • Week 5 - Questions/Comments Assignment
    Week 5 - Questions/Comments Week 5 - Questions/Comments
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Fishburn Acceptable Social Lotteries.pdf Attachment
    Fishburn Acceptable Social Lotteries.pdf Fishburn Acceptable Social Lotteries.pdf
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  • Brandt, Collective Choice Lotteries Attachment
    Brandt, Collective Choice Lotteries Brandt, Collective Choice Lotteries
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Zeckhauser, Majority Rule and Lotteries Attachment
    Zeckhauser, Majority Rule and Lotteries Zeckhauser, Majority Rule and Lotteries
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  • Shepsle, Majority Rule and Lotteries Attachment
    Shepsle, Majority Rule and Lotteries Shepsle, Majority Rule and Lotteries
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • F. Brandt. Rolling the dice: Recent results in probabilistic social choice External Url
    F. Brandt. Rolling the dice: Recent results in probabilistic social choice F. Brandt. Rolling the dice: Recent results in probabilistic social choice
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  • fishburn-lotteries-social-choice.pdf Attachment
    fishburn-lotteries-social-choice.pdf fishburn-lotteries-social-choice.pdf
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Consistent probabilistic social choice. Attachment
    F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Consistent probabilistic social choice. F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. Consistent probabilistic social choice.
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete

Using lotteries to choose representatives, I

Using lotteries to choose representatives, I
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Using lotteries to choose representatives, I 1637491    
  • Week 6 - Questions/Comments Assignment
    Week 6 - Questions/Comments Week 6 - Questions/Comments
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Guerrero, Against elections: The lottocratic alternative Attachment
    Guerrero, Against elections: The lottocratic alternative Guerrero, Against elections: The lottocratic alternative
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete

Using lotteries to choose representatives, II

Using lotteries to choose representatives, II
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Using lotteries to choose representatives, II 1637522    
  • Week 7 - Questions/Comments Assignment
    Week 7 - Questions/Comments Week 7 - Questions/Comments
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Flanigan et al., Fair algorithms for selecting citizens’ assemblies Attachment
    Flanigan et al., Fair algorithms for selecting citizens’ assemblies Flanigan et al., Fair algorithms for selecting citizens’ assemblies
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete

Evaluative Voting

Evaluative Voting
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Evaluative Voting 1637553    
  • Kruger and Sanver, An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation Attachment
    Kruger and Sanver, An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation Kruger and Sanver, An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete

Quadratic voting

Quadratic voting
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Quadratic voting 1637717    
  • Laurence and Sher, Ethical Considerations in Quadratic Voting Attachment
    Laurence and Sher, Ethical Considerations in Quadratic Voting Laurence and Sher, Ethical Considerations in Quadratic Voting
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
  • Posner and Weyl, Quadratic Voting Attachment
    Posner and Weyl, Quadratic Voting Posner and Weyl, Quadratic Voting
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete

Weighted Voting

Weighted Voting
Module Completed Module In Progress Module Locked
Weighted Voting 1637718    
  • M. Pivato and A. Soh, Weighted representative democracy Attachment
    M. Pivato and A. Soh, Weighted representative democracy M. Pivato and A. Soh, Weighted representative democracy
    Score at least   Must score at least   to complete this module item Scored at least   Module item has been completed by scoring at least   View Must view in order to complete this module item Viewed Module item has been viewed and is complete Mark done Must mark this module item done in order to complete Marked done Module item marked as done and is complete Contribute Must contribute to this module item to complete it Contributed Contributed to this module item and is complete Submit Must submit this module item to complete it Submitted Module item submitted and is complete
 
minimum score must view must submit must contribute
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